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I. INTRODUCTION
The process of reforming China's banking sector has been
described as "crossing the river by feeling the stones."' In recent
years, China has shifted from a strictly planned economy to a
"market-oriented" system based on capitalist principles of
privatization and competition.2 Such reforms resulted from
China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, which requires China to open its banking industry to foreign
competition by the end of 2006.' Undoubtedly, the task is
daunting. China's banking industry has been plagued by the
inability to endure financial crises, poor bank management, risky
loan practices, and scandals.4 As it attempts to remedy these
problems, China is faced also with the fact that its banking
industry has a fairly rudimentary structure! For many prudential
and regulatory issues, China lacks any legislative history on which
to rely;6 its banking market is a blank slate for reform. Therefore,
China is not simply updating a pre-existing system, but instead
importing mechanisms and policies entirely foreign to its banking
industry.7
1. Sudip Roy, China's Road to Reform, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1, 2005, available at
2005 WLNR 21055027.
2. Berry Fong-Chung Hsu et al., Banking Liberalization and Restructuring in
Post-WTO China, 21 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 23,24 (2005).
3. Id. at 28.
4. See generally Jack E. Jirak, Note, Equity Investment in Chinese Banks: A
Doorway into China's Banking Sector, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 329, 333-34 (2006)
(describing in detail the various problems facing China's banking industry).
5. Jamil Anderlini, CSRC to Take Over Bond Market Oversight Role:
Regulatory Switch from 'Old Guard' Planners Expected to Hasten Growth, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 13, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 12022833.
6. See generally Professor Volker Behr, Managing Director, Inst. for Eur. Legal
Sys., Lecture at the University of North Carolina School of Law (Sept. 20, 2006)
(describing China's habit of importing legislation from other countries).
7. See generally id. (noting that reforms in China often do not have precursors in
Chinese case law or statutes).
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Deposit insurance is one such import. China has
acknowledged the necessity of deposit insurance, and industry
experts are evaluating various deposit insurance systems (DISs)
8from other legal regimes. As China prepares to implement a
viable system, it will look to European nations, as well as the
United States, for guidance in constructing a workable Chinese
version of deposit insurance.9 China also likely will pay close
attention to Russia's newly-implemented DIS, given the similar
historical and political backgrounds of both countries.1 0 Russia's
model may provide guideposts as China searches for a balance
between its goal of a "market-oriented" system and its socialist
heritage.11 These systems represent "stones" that China can
examine and learn from as it transitions into a more advanced
banking system.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of China's
banking system and the major problems facing its banking
industry. 2 Part III explains deposit insurance generally and how
China will benefit from implementing a DIS.13 Part IV will outline
the DISs used by the United States, a sample of countries in the
European Union, and Russia. 14 In addition to discussing the basic
features of each system, Part IV will explain how China may find
each model relevant to its current problems. 15 By way of
comparison, Part V will discuss which features of these systems
China should adopt with respect to coverage, funding, and
16
membership regulations.
8. Minister: China to Set Up National Financial Regulator, CHINA DAILY, Sept.
13, 2006, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-09/13/content_688
062.htm.
9. See infra notes 117-87 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 188-221 and accompanying text.
11. Roy, supra note 1; see generally China is in Favor of More Reform, CHINA
POST, June 14, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10253167 (discussing the tension
between market-based reform and the relinquishment of governmental control).
12. See infra notes 17-58 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 59-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 117-37, 143-79, 188-209 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 106-16, 138-42, 180-87,210-21 and accompanying text
16. See infra notes 222-84 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND: CHINA'S BANKING INDUSTRY
A. China's Banking Structure
China's banking system is dominated by four state-owned
commercial banks (the Big Four): the Agricultural Bank of China,
the Bank of China, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
and the China Construction Bank. 7 While the government has
made efforts to divest state and commercial interests, the banks
remain involved in both areas of banking. 8 Currently, these banks
possess around fifty-nine percent of both the total assets and
deposits of all financial institutions in China.' 9 The rest of China's
banking industry is comprised of two private banks, twelve joint-
stock commercial banks, and a vast array of rural and urban
cooperative banks.z
China has created several agencies to regulate the banking
sector. China's State Council issues banking-related policy and
oversees the entire industry.2' The traditional banking authorities
have been the People's Bank of China (PBC) and the Ministry of
22Finance. In recent years, however, both agencies have been
directed to focus primarily on fiscal and monetary policy.2 3 Amid
efforts to reform, China created the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) in 2003, which assumed the supervisory
24duties of the PBC and the Ministry of Finance. CBRC is now the
17. Banks: Domestic Banks, COUNTRY FIN. CHINA, Aug. 21, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 15382206. As their titles indicate, each bank was designed originally to
provide financial assistance to a particular sector of the economy; however, such
distinctions have disappeared in recent years. Id.
18. See Lawrence L. C. Lee, Integration of International Financial Regulatory
Standards for the Chinese Economic Area: The Challenge for China, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 30-31 (1999). In an attempt to disgorge the Big
Four of policy-related loans, the government created three policy banks, each
designed to service a particular area of governmental interest. Id.
19. Carol G. Liu, Note, Scaling the Great Wall: An Analysis of Foreign Banks'
Entry into China, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 397, 399 (2005).
20. Banks: Domestic Banks, supra note 17.
21. Banks: Bank Regulators, COUNTRY FIN. CHINA, Aug. 21, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 15380816.
22. Id.
23. Banks: Domestic Banks, supra note 17.
24. Banks: Bank Regulators, supra note 21.
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appointed "watchdog" over the banking sector.25 These groups
collectively form the prudential supervision that monitors risk
assessments and loan practices among China's banks in order to
prevent insolvencies, and, if necessary, to mitigate losses to
depositors.26
Noticeably absent in China's banking policy is a formal
DIS.27 Instead, the government acts as a de facto insurer for
deposits in China's domestic banks.28 Chinese officials have stated
that a DIS will be implemented by the time its banking industry is
opened to foreign competition at the end of 2006.29 Zhou
Xiaochuan, governor of the PBC, stated simply that, "a deposit
insurance scheme is being researched,"30 but few other details are
known. The PBC established the Deposit Insurance Department
in 2005 to regulate the system, and the CBRC hinted that the DIS
may be funded by banks themselves."
B. Problems Facing China's Banking Industry
As the PBC's chief Zhou Xiaochuan noted, the four
"incentives" for reforming the banking industry were economic
crisis, scandals, competition from abroad, and shareholder interest
in more sound banking techniques and standards.32 In 1997, the
Asian financial community suffered a recession that exposed
several inadequacies in China's banking industry.33 The crisis was
25. Id.
26. PHILIP R. WOOD, FINANCIAL LAW IN CHINA, 25-26 (2005) (on file with N.C.
Banking Inst.).
27. Zhang Lu, Overseas Bankers Raise Concerns, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 21, 2006,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-08/24/content-672789_2.htm.
28. Xiao Tang, Abstract, Banking on Insurance, 47 BEIJING REV. 35, 35 (2004),
available at 2004 WLNR 264103.
29. Banks: Bank Regulators, supra note 21.
30. China Will Not Cut Dollar Forex Reserves- Central Bank Head- UPDATE,
AFX ASIA Focus, Mar. 6, 2006.
31. Banks: Bank Regulators, supra note 21.
32. Cary Huang, Scandals 'Help Push Banking Reform:' Central Bank Chief
Zhou Xiaochuan Says Loss, Not Foresight, is Often Driving Force Behind Necessary
Change, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 25,2005, available at 2005 WLNR 8228463.
33. Karl Lester M. Yap, Asian Crisis Repeat Unlikely, but RP Banks Remain
Weak, Bus. WORLD (PHIL.), Sept. 6, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 15388418. As one
analyst noted, recessions are a "litmus test" by which to evaluate a bank's financial
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a wake-up call to banks, leading officials to consider updating
China's primitive banking system.34
1. Poor Lending Practices
Risky bank loans have proven problematic, especially with
regard to funding state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which tend to
suffer severe losses. 5 The Big Four traditionally have financed
36SOEs at the behest of the government. When an SOE fails to
repay its loan to the bank, the government acts a guarantor and
simply writes off the debt. 37 This policy has led to a significant
increase in non-performing loans (NPLs).38 Moreover, such loans
have stigmatized China's banking industry as being a risky
market.39 This has prompted calls for the creation of a proper DIS,
as it is predicted that China's government will not be able to bail
out banks in the future.4°
In addition to lending to SOEs, the Big Four's poor loan
practices include extending risky loans in exchange for short-term
41profits. Indeed, risk assessment in China seems nearly non-
existent: "creditworthiness and objective assessments of risk are
not the prime factors when it comes to deciding how and where to
lend. More important are relationships and the political
connections of the firms involved. In many cases, bank executives
stability and lending practices. Asian Banks Face Cyclical Risks: S & P, Bus.
STANDARD, June 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 11137796.
34. See Anderlini, supra note 5 (citing JP Morgan's Jing Ulrich as referring to
China's banking system as a "rudimentary market").
35. Banks: Domestic Banks, supra note 17; The Operating Environment: State
Role in the Economy, COUNTRY COM. CHINA, Mar. 20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
5591995.
36. Banks: Domestic Banks, supra note 17.
37. See Tang, supra note 28 (noting that the State serves as the guarantor for
deposits).
38. See Weitseng Chen, Symposium, WTO: Time's Up for Chinese Banks-
China's Banking Reform and Non-performing Loan Disposal, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 239,
240-43 (2006) (discussing the negative effects SOEs inflict on the banking industry).
39. Asian Banks Face Cyclical Risks: S & P, supra note 33.
40. Chen Hua, Government to Bail Out Poor Financial Institutions, CHINA
DAILY, July 28, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
07/28/content_463 995.htm.
41. Keep the Lid on Bad Loans, CHINA DAILY, May 18, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 8582388.
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themselves hold powerful positions in the government."42 Such
practices have led to a glut of NPLs, which account for roughly
forty percent of the total outstanding loans in China. 43  New
statistics indicate that current reforms have not curbed such
practices."4 For example, in the first half of 2006, Chinese banks
accumulated eighty percent of their annual loan target, increasing
their outstanding bank loans by U.S.$273 billion to a combined
total of U.S.$2.7 trillion.45 NPLs have contributed significantly to
such growth, rising by U.S.$150 billion per year since 2000.46 The
lending spree highlights the overwhelming tendency for domestic
banks to prioritize short-term profits over more conservative
lending standards.47 The result has led to a growing concern that
China's banking sector is too unstable.48 For example, the
Standard and Poor's rating agency considers China to have a
moderately high-risk banking industry.49
2. Scandal and Corruption
In addition, various scandals have marred China's banking
industry. In June 2006, one branch of China's Bank of
Communications announced losses of approximately U.S.$25
million due to fraud.5 ° Several scandals have demonstrated that
political connections, rather than a borrower's riskiness, are more
determinative as to whether a bank issues a particular loan.5' For
example, the China Construction Bank fired its chairman Zhang
Enzhao for behavior stemming from loans issued to Qin Hui, one
42. Cautionary Lesson from a New Bank Scandal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar.
16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 4013223.
43. Chen, supra note 38, at 239.
44. See Test of Bank Reforms, CHINA DAILY, July 17, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 12307335.
45. Id.
46. Chen, supra note 38, at 241.
47. Prioritize Bank Reforms, CHINA DAILY, June 14, 2006, available at 2006
WLNR 10252600.
48. See generally Asian Banks Face Cyclical Risks: S & P, supra note 33
(describing the Asian banking industry's overall medium-high risk rating).
49. Id.
50. Prioritize Bank Reforms, supra note 47.
51. Cautionary Lesson from a New Bank Scandal, supra note 42.
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of China's media moguls. 2 Allegedly, Zhang was taking kickbacks
in exchange for Qin's media-related companies' obtaining several
sizeable loans.53 Scandals also resulted from individuals serving
simultaneously as bank executives and government officials.54 For
example, local judges have been accused of forging legal papers at
the direction of bank executives so that the banks can write-off
bad loans.55
While the government has undertaken to purge the
industry of corruption, efforts have had only a marginal effect. In
2005, for example, Liu Mingkang, CBRC's chairman, identified
banking crimes as a focus for reform.56 CBRC addressed the issue
by circulating a document among bank employees listing ways in
which institutions can curb inappropriate practices. Over a year
later, however, Liu observed: "[m]ost banks have not done a good
job of reforming their middle and back-office management. In a
great number of transactions, the operational risks are
enormous." 
58
III. DEPOSIT INSURANCE
A. DIS Generally
Banks interact with depositors in a delicate relationship
based on good faith and confidence.' 9 Individuals entrust money
52. Id.; see also Growing Mountain of Bank Scandals Obstructs Road to Listings,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 18, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 6005495 (noting the
dismissal of Zhang due to improper conduct).
53. Cautionary Lesson from a New Bank Scandal, supra note 42; Growing
Mountain of Bank Scandals Obstructs Road to Listings, supra note 52.
54. Cautionary Lesson from a New Bank Scandal, supra note 42.
55. Banning Banks from Releasing Illegal Loans, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 12, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 12054882.
56. Banking Watchdog Vows to Reduce Risks, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 19, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 6109645.
57. Id.
58. Jamil Anderlini, Risks Rising in China Banking System: Regulators Call for
Tighter Lending Curbs as New Bank Loans Top 1.8 Trillion Yuan, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 16,2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10367625.
59. Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, Symposium, The Relationship Between a Single
Financial Regulator and the Deposit Insurance System: Analyzing Japan, 39 INT'L
LAW. 63, 67 (2005); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and
Democracy: The Illusive Quest for Deregulation, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5-6 (2006)
(discussing the inherently unstable nature of banks).
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to an institution with the understanding that they may withdraw
60their deposits at any time. In order to make a profit, banks do
not retain every deposit but instead loan the funds out to
borrowers. 61 Thus, a bank's profits are computed by deducting the
interest paid on deposits from the interest earned from its loans.62
As a result, banks cannot honor a withdrawal of every account at
once.6 ' Although a bank may liquidate all of its assets to repay
depositors, a bank still does not have enough liquidity to pay every
depositor at once, due to its outstanding loans.64 Under these
circumstances, not only would depositors lose their money, the
bank also would become insolvent.65 To counteract this risk in the
United States, the Federal Reserve Board requires banks to
maintain a fraction of its deposits in reserve.6 Currently, the
minimum reserve requirement is around ten percent of all deposits
at an institution. 6' This amount, however, would still not satisfy all
requests if more than ten percent of depositors demanded
68withdrawalat once. Moreover, a bank run at one institution can
have ripple effects on other deposit institutions, sending a panic-
stricken mob into the bank next door demanding withdrawal of its
deposits as well.69
Since banks do not retain all deposits in their cash vault,
what keeps depositors from worrying about whether to race to
their local bank and demand satisfaction of their deposit? The
answer is deposit insurance. Deposit insurance generally refers to
a limited guarantee that depositors will be repaid, at least in part,
for any deposits lost as a result of a bank failure.7° Such guarantees
60. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 152-53 (2d ed. 2004).
61. Id. at 151.
62. Id.
63. Macey, supra note 59, at 5-6.
64. Wally Suphap, Toward Effective Risk-Adjusted Bank Deposit Insurance: A
Transnational Strategy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 835 (2004).
65. George G. Kaufman, Deposit Insurance, LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY,
http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/Depositlnsurance.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
66. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 60, at 156-57.
67. Id. at 158.
68. See id.
69. Suphap, supra note 64, at 835.
70. Id. at 833.
[Vol. I11
EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS
are designed to encourage consumers to open accounts at financial
institutions.71 In general, an effective system of deposit insurance
aspires to provide: (1) clarity and transparency among depositors
regarding funding, coverage, and limitations; (2) strong prudential
regulation and supervision over banking activities; and (3) limited
coverage of particular institutions.72
B. Benefits of a DIS in China
1. Reducing Moral Hazard
"Moral hazard" refers to an institution's tendency to take
excessive risks in the hope of achieving higher profits.73 Some
critics of deposit insurance argue that by implementing a safety net
for institutions, a DIS creates further "moral hazard., 74 The
introduction of deposit insurance, however, creates a sound basis
for regulation and oversight by the government of the banking
industry.7 As mentioned above, the banking industry in China is
plagued already by poor management and needs stricter
prudential regulation.7 6 A well-designed system can resolve these
issues through greater transparency, adequate internal audits, and
continuous external reviews of an institution's activities.
Furthermore, a DIS provides leverage for a regulatory agency to
impose penalties on poorly run institutions.78 The degree to which
deposit insurance improves the banking industry is contingent
upon the choices made by Chinese officials when designing the
DIS.79 Thus, deposit insurance has the potential to address some
of China's poor lending practices. The subsequent sections of this
Note include a discussion of how particular features of deposit
71. Kaufman, supra note 65.
72. See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 59, at 65-66 (describing the desired elements of
financial regulators regarding the oversight of a DIS).
73. Macey, supra note 59, at 10.
74. Yokoi-Arai, supra note 59, at 68.
75. Macey, supra note 59, at 10.
76. See supra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
77. See Yokoi-Arai, supra note 59, at 67 (listing the various concerns regarding
effective deposit insurance, as well as measures implemented to resolve such issues).
78. Id. at 68-70.
79. See infra notes 222-84 and accompanying text.
2007]
NORTH CAROLNA BANK!NG INSTITUTE
insurance will improve bank management, thereby reducing moral
hazard.80
2. Industry Sustainability
In addition to holding bank management accountable,
deposit insurance will enable the banking industry in China to
weather another financial crisis. 8' As U.S. Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson noted during his recent visit to China: "[a] healthy,
strong financial sector, strong capital markets, strong banking
system, are absolutely necessary for long-term economic
success." 82 The International Association of Deposit Insurers
found that most countries establish a DIS in response to, or in
preparation for, a financial crisis.83 Since massive bank failures can
lead to sharp economic recessions, in part due to the large amount
of money removed from the economy as a result of bank runs,84
deposit insurance has often been implemented in reaction to an
economic depression.8 1 "[D]eposit insurance ... has an enormous
impact in increasing the stability of the banking system. Simply
because it exists, the threat against which it insures is much less
likely to occur. It is as if life insurance somehow prolonged life.
86
For example, the United States introduced federal deposit
insurance in the wake of a high number of bank failures during the
87 88Great Depression.8' Despite some criticism of the new system,
80. See infra notes 222-84 and accompanying text.
81. See RESEARCH AND GUIDANCE COMM., INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS,
QUESTIONS ON THE DESIGN OF A DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM 4-5 (2004) (finding
that most countries implement a DIS to maintain financial stability).
82. Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Paulson Urges More Competition, Access in
Chinese Financial Markets, BANKING REP., Sept. 25, 2006, at 455.
83. RESEARCH AND GUIDANCE COMM., supra note 81, at 4-5.
84. Kaufman, supra note 65.
85. See Macey, supra note 59, at 4-10 (discussing the various regulatory responses
of governments when faced with financial crises and bank failures).
86. Suphap, supra note 64, at 835 (quoting professors Joseph Stiglitz and Carl
Walsh).
87. Kaufman, supra note 65.
88. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and Competition:
The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595,
618 (1999). Interestingly, many politicians at the time, including President Roosevelt,
disapproved of deposit insurance on the grounds that it forced stronger banks to
subsidize weaker banks. Id.
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the FDIC proved successful at significantly reducing the bank runs
that led to bank failures.89 In 1934, only nine banks failed.90
During the forty years after federal deposit insurance was
implemented, an average of only thirteen banks failed each year.91
Similarly, the United Kingdom converted its informal, voluntary
system of deposit insurance into a formal DIS only after suffering
a financial crisis.92
In addition to raising consumer confidence in banks,
deposit insurance provides a mechanism through which the
banking industry can repair itself.93 Rather than the implicit
protection and help from the government, a DIS creates a
substantive policy on which investors, lenders, borrowers, and
depositors can rely.94 Therefore, China can expect that a DIS will
improve its chances of sustaining its banking industry through
times of trouble.95
3. Opportunity for Foreign Investment
China is on the cusp of a very lucrative opportunity. By
agreeing to open its banking market to foreign competition by the
end of 2006,96 China is taking a critical step towards sustained
economic growth.97 Foreign institutions have demonstrated an
89. Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FDIC, A BRIEF HISTORY OF DEPOSIT
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998).
90. Id.
91. Mandanis Schooner & Taylor, supra note 88, at 618.
92. Id. at 629, 631. Prior to 1979, banks in the United Kingdom operated under
an informal, voluntary system of deposit insurance. Id. at 629. During the Secondary
Banking Crisis of 1973-74, however, a number of banks became insolvent, raising
concerns that a formal DIS, among other things, was needed. Id. at 625. The
Banking Act of 1979 responded to the insolvencies by creating the Deposit
Protection Scheme, as well as a funding mechanism for the plan via the Deposit
Protection Fund. Id. at 631.
93. John Raymond LaBrosse, Sec'y Gen., Int'l Ass'n of Deposit Insurers,
Remarks at the Public Lecture of the First Deposit Protection Awareness Week
(Sept. 15, 2005).
94. See generally Luc Laeven, The Polictical Economy of Deposit Insurance
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3247, 2004) (describing the
advantages of a de jure system over a de facto one).
95. See generally RESEARCH AND GUIDANCE COMM., supra note 81, at 4-5
(discussing the stabilizing effect of deposit insurance).
96. Jirak, supra note 4, at 333.
97. McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 455.
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eagerness to enter China's market.98 In 2005, Bank of America
invested U.S.$3 billion into the China Construction Bank.99 The
same year, Goldman Sachs, Allianz, and American Express bought
shares in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. 1°
Acknowledging this trend, a 2005 United Nations survey listed
China as the favorite investment market for foreign direct
investment.' Thus, the potential to maximize its international
appeal is at stake for China in its reform process. The success of
an open market, however, is contingent upon the stability and
sound structure of China's banking and financial industries.'02 As
the European Union notes, deposit insurance is an essential
element to a developed banking market planning to transact
business both domestically and abroad. 10 3 In order to provide a
first-world banking market, China must align itself with these
international standards.1i4 Additionally, replacing governmental
support of banks with a DIS may be a necessary step for China to
comply with WTO standards, so that foreign and domestic banks
are treated equally by the government.05
IV. MODELS FOR COMPARISON
China's Communist history has precluded it from
developing a reliable legal code on which to base its new policy.'
6
China's desire to enter globalized markets during the 1970s
required shifting from a planned economy to a socialist market
98. See Banks: Domestic Banks, supra note 17.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The Operating Environment: Foreign Investment, COUNTRY COM. CHINA,
Mar. 20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 5592016.
102. McLaughlin, supra note 82, at 455.
103. Council Directive 94/19, 1994 O.J. (L 135) (EC).
104. See generally Theresa H. Wang, Trading the People's Homes for the People's
Olympics: The Property Regime in China, 15 PAC. RIM L & POL'Y J. 599, 623 (2006).
The author explains how China imported foreign property law as a means by which
to update its legal system so that it is more contemporaneous with first-world
countries. Id.
105. Fong-Chung Hsu et al., supra note 2, at 40-41; Chinese Banks Overhauled,
BANGKOK POST (THAIL.), Dec. 20, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20568926.
106. Behr, supra note 6, at 4-5.
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economy. 07 The goal was not an abandonment of socialism, but
instead a marriage of a planned economy and market principles.08
Although the transition has attracted substantial foreign
investment into China, the government has been forced to create a
legitimate and workable legal framework.09 Since most businesses
operating in international markets are regulated by prescribed
statutory codes, China has been faced with the challenge of
comporting with these practices by establishing a system that
guarantees predictability, transparency, and definite legal
standards.10 As China has done with its criminal and civil codes, it
reviews policies from other countries, and subsequently adopts
them into Chinese law."' Not surprisingly, some of the imported
concepts from foreign law appear out of place against the
backdrop of China's legal history. 112 Notwithstanding this
awkwardness, China has benefited from this approach by learning
from the mistakes of other countries."' To be sure, this method is
simple. After all, "you don't have to invent the wheel, in the case
that it already exists.
11 4
The success of China's DIS largely depends on the
particular features of China's anticipated system."5 While deposit
insurance is as varied as the countries implementing it,"16 three
107. Id. at 5.
108. Wang, supra note 104, at 603.
109. Id. at 601, 603-04.
110. Behr, supra note 6, at 5.
111. See id. at 4-10.
112. See Wang, supra note 104, at 601, 606-07. For example, in regard to
constitutional amendments on property rights, China adopted the "just
compensation" language of the United States' Taking clause in reference to eminent
domain policy. Id. China's traditional approach to property rights, however,
contradicts the notion of "just compensation." Id. Instead, government projects
have repeatedly abrogated individual property rights, which have been afforded very
little protection. Id.
113. Behr, supra note 6, at 7-8.
114. Behr, Managing Director, Inst. for Eur. Legal Systems, Lecture at the
University of North Carolina School of Law (Sept. 20, 2006).
115. See Asli-Demirguc-Kunt & Tolga Sobaci, Deposit Insurance Around The
World: A Data Base (May 1, 2000) (unpublished working paper, on file with the
World Bank). The report lists numerous variables and types of deposit insurance for
many countries around the world, showing that each country can customize its own
DIS. Id.
116. See generally id. (offering a table comparing the various factors in deposit
insurance with a large sample of countries).
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characteristics help to provide a general basis for comparison:
funding, coverage, and membership regulations. Existing systems
in the United States, the European Union, and Russia may
provide effective models which China may study as it creates its
own DIS.
A. United States
1. Basic Structure
During the Great Depression, following a multitude of
bank failures,"7 the federal government introduced its first version
of deposit insurance."' While some states formerly had attempted
to provide some form of insurance, none were successful in the
long-term." 9 The Banking Act of 1933, a part of which was the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, created the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which serves as the regulatory
agency for federal deposit insurance. 2°
In its original form, the FDIC provided 100% coverage to
all deposits up to U.S.$2,500 per account.12 In order to pay for the
insurance coverage, banks were charged a flat-rate premium that
was one-twelfth of one percent of an institution's total domestic
deposits. 12 2 To be insured, banks were required to apply for
membership with the FDIC, which had rigorous criteria by which
to measure an institution's admission. 12 The FDIC board
determined an institution's stability by evaluating its earning
prospects and current capital, as well as the quality of its
management and reputation within its community.
24
117. Mandanis Schooner & Taylor, supra note 88, at 616 (noting that between
1929 and 1933, the number of banks shrank from 24,026 to 13,949).
118. Kaufman, supra note 65.
119. Id.
120. Mark E. Nance & Bernd Singhof, Banking's Influence over Non-Bank
Companies After Glass-Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 1305, 1327 (2000).
121. Kaufman, supra note 65.
122. Id.
123. Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FDIC, supra note 89, at 37.
124. Id.
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In its present form, the FDIC retains its fundamental
principles of prudential supervision.1 25  Currently, deposits are
covered up to U.S.$100,000 per depositor, per bank. 2 6  The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
eliminated flat-rate premiums. Instead, the Act instituted a risk-
based assessment of banks, charging premiums based on the risks
they pose, which ranged from twenty-three to thirty-one cents per
U.S.$100 of deposits. In 1996, the Deposit Insurance Funds Act
fixed the designated reserve ratio at 1.25%.129 Provided the ratio
did not drop below this level, well-capitalized banks were not
assessed a premium.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005,
however, adjusts the way in which rates are assessed. 3 Instead of
relying solely on whether the reserve ratio is satisfied, the FDIC
board will assess premiums for each institution by weighing a
series of factors, including the projected needs of the fund and the
effects of assessments on depository institutions. 32  Also, the
reserve ratio may range from 1.15% to 1.5%. 13' Accordingly, well-
capitalized banks are not exempt automatically and may still be
subject to assessments.'34 The new guidelines are designed to give
125. See generally id. (describing the chronological progression of FDIC since
1993).
126. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a)(3)(A) (2006); FDIC, INSURING YOUR DEPOSITS (2006),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insuringdeposits/iyd.pdf. New
amendments enacted in 2006 provide for coverage of up to U.S.$250,000 for certain
retirement accounts. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-171, § 2103, 120 Stat. 4, 9-12 (2006) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a) (2006)).
Furthermore, the U.S.$100,000 coverage limit for most accounts may be adjusted for
inflation. Id. The Act requires that the Board of Directors assess changes by April 1,
2010, with subsequent reviews every five years. Id.
127. Craig M. Scheer, Note, The Second Banking Directive and Deposit Insurance
in the European Union: Implications for U.S. Banks, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 171,197 (1994).
128. Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FDIC, supra note 89, at 54.
129. Id. at 63.
130. See id. (describing various concerns regarding the designated reserve ratio,
including the exemption of highly-rated institutions from paying premiums).
131. See Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, § 2104, 120 Stat. at 12-14
(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1817(b), 1817(g), 1828(h) (2006).
132. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2103,
120 Stat. 4, 12-14 (2006) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a) (2006)).
133. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1817(b)(3)(B) (2006).
134. Id.
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the FDIC board greater discretion in charging assessments, which
in turn should make the system more sensitive to risk.' The
FDIC board continues to monitor closely bank capitalization,
management activity, and overall stability.136 It regularly reviews
institutions for compliance with FDIC standards.137
2. Relevancy: A Frequent Paradigm for China
The FDIC represents an established and tested version of
deposit insurance, making it a logical framework on which other
countries may base their own versions of deposit insurance."' In
fact, at a financial conference in September 2006, Vice Finance
Minister Li Yong reported that administrators were studying the
FDIC as China develops its own regulation methods. 139  Not
surprisingly, China has studied U.S. financial regulatory agencies
in the past. 140 The PBC is virtually a replica of the Federal
Reserve, but with less autonomy. 141 Similarly, China's monetary-
policy committee mimics its U.S. counterpart, the Federal Open
Market Committee. 42 It therefore would not be unusual for China
likewise to imitate many aspects of the FDIC system. Even if
China decides to implement an entirely different form of DIS,
China's system likely will be judged in terms of its deviation from
the paradigm of the FDIC.
B. European Union
1. Basic Structure
In 1994, the European Union issued a Directive outlining
the requisite provisions for deposit insurance in each of its
135. Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,910 (proposed July
24, 2006).
136. Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FDIC, supra note 89, at 59.
137. FDIC, supra note 126.
138. See generally Kaufman, supra note 65 (describing the long history of deposit
insurance in the United States).
139. Minister: China to Set Up National Financial Regulator, supra note 8.
140. Banks: Bank Regulators, supra note 21.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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143
member states, stating that a DIS is necessary for maintaining
financial stability and for engaging in international banking)44
While the Directive allows each country substantial flexibility in
terms of its scope, regulation, operation, and coverage, the
Directive does enumerate several requirements .' Article 3(1) of
the Directive makes deposit insurance mandatory for each
member country.' 46 Most notably, the Directive sets the minimum
amount of coverage for each depositor at ECU 20,000 147
(approximately U.S.$25,000).'4 Furthermore, the Directive makes
clear that coverage is based on a per depositor, per bank basis.9
The stated purpose of the Directive is to create
"harmonious development" among member countries, while also
"increasing the stability of the banking system and protection for
savers."'"5 By requiring all banks to provide some sort of deposit
guarantee, the European Union seeks to create a level playing
field among EU banks. 5' The Directive also includes a "topping
off" provision, which allows foreign branches to voluntarily obtain
143. See Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103.
144. Id. ("[W]hereas it is indispensable to ensure a harmonized minimum level of
deposit protection wherever deposits are located in the Community whereas such
deposit protection is as essential as the prudential rules for the completion of the
single banking market . .
145. Id.
146. Id. at art. 3. The Directive applies to all banks taking deposits, including
credit institutions, which may only take deposits if they are insured by a national DIS.
Ingo Wallenborn, Competitiveness of U.S. Banks after Gramm-Leach-Bliley: A
Comparison between the U.S. and European Regulatory Systems, 20 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 243,265 (2001).
147. Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103, at art. 7. The Directive also allows
for a temporary minimum of ECU 15,000 for Member states which, at the time of the
adoption of the Directive, do not provide depositors with at least ECU 20,000 of
coverage. Id. In January, 1999, the ECU was replaced by the real currency known
as the Euro (EUR). XE.com, Information on the Euro Currency, http://www.xe.com
/euro.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
148. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$25,044.95. See Universal
Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ucc/ [hereinafter Universal Currency
Converter] (last visited Oct. 12, 2006) (providing an online currency conversion
calculator).
149. Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103, at art. 7; see also Scheer, supra note
127, at 193 (noting that multiple deposits made at a single institution are aggregated
for coverage purposes, whereas the same deposits made at different institutions
would be insured exclusive of each other).
150. Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103, at pmbl., para. 1.
151. Id. at pmbl., para. 19.
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extra coverage from the host state. 2 This enables foreign banks
that may receive less insurance from their home countries to offer
equal protection to depositors in a host country offering greater
deposit insurance coverage to its domestic banks.'53 Also, the
Directive enacted a temporary buffer period during which foreign
banks were not allowed to offer more coverage than the host
state.54 Such equalizing, according to the European Union, fosters
a better environment for competition among foreign and domestic
banks 55  The Directive also provides uniform guidelines for
prudential regulations to ensure that banks ascribe to at least a
minimum standard of sound banking practices. 56 Another goal of
the Directive's is to encourage bank personnel to disclose the
coverage and operation of the DIS to depositors."5 Thus, the
legislation reflects a concern both for the adequacy of institutions,
as well as for educating depositors about deposit insurance. 58
Interestingly, the EU Directive does not prescribe any
particular method of funding deposit insurance.'59 As a result of
this flexibility, many different types of DISs exist throughout
Europe. For instance, in the United Kingdom, deposit insurance
has existed both as a privately coordinated effort, as well as a
state-enacted system.' 60 Originally, the Bank of England, the
traditional banking regulator, developed an informal, voluntary
form of deposit insurance.16  Recently, however, the United
Kingdom has formalized its system by way of statutory
,162authorization. In 2000, the Financial Services Compensation
152. Scheer, supra note 127, at 190.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 189. The provision was effective until December 31, 1999, after which
foreign banks were allowed to offer more or less insurance coverage than the host
state. Id.
155. Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103, at pmbl., para. 18; see Scheer, supra
note 127, at 190 (noting that the intent of these provisions is to eliminate the disparity
among banks as a result of varying levels of coverage).
156. See generally Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103 (describing the purpose
for the legislation).
157. Id. at art. 9, pmbl., para. 21.
158. See id.
159. Scheer, supra note 127, at 197.
160. Mandanis Schooner & Taylor, supra note 88, at 629-32, 646.
161. Id. at 646-47.
162. Id. at 649.
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Scheme marked a new phase of deposit insurance in the United
Kingdom.' 63 This comprehensive program offers coverage of 100%
of the first £2,000 and ninety percent of the next £33,000, up to a
maximum of £31,700 per claim' 6 (approximately U.S.$59,000). 65
The system represents a collaborative effort between commercial
institutions and supervising authorities to regulate the industry,
with banks funding the scheme.' 66 Alternatively, Italy offers two
privately run DISs, with coverage up to ECU 100,000 167
(approximately U.S.$125,000).'6 France guarantees deposits up to
400,000 francs (approximately U.S.$76,000) 169 under its DIS, the
Association Francaise des Banques 7 °
Germany was one of the first European countries to offer
deposit insurance, but never required it by statute prior to the EU
Directive.71 During the late 1960s, Germany's Private Banker's
Association formed the Deposit Insurance Fund, which provided
optional deposit insurance to many banks. 72 Although voluntary,
most private banks became members of the Deposit Insurance
Fund.73 In 1998, Germany complied with the EU Directive by
passing the German Deposit Guarantee Act. 17' The Act
authorized the Compensation Scheme of German Banks, which
extended insurance coverage to all institutions. 175  Unlike the
163. See OXERA CONSULTING LTD., FUNDING OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
COMPENSATION SCHEME (2006) (describing the new statutory scheme).
164. Id. at 4.
165. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$58,817.47. See Universal
Currency Converter, supra note 148.
166. RONALD MACDONALD, BANK OF ENGLAND, DEPOSIT INSURANCE 13-21
(1996).
167. Dina Colon, Note, The Foreign Bank Exemption to the Sarbanes-Oxley
Prohibition on Loans to Directors and Officers, 4 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 123,138 (2005).
168. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$125,219.64. See Universal
Currency Converter, supra note 148.
169. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$76,319.26. See id..
170. Colon, supra note 167, at 139.
171. Jens-Hinrich Binder, Symposium, Regulatory Competition between the
Deposit Insurer and a Single Financial Regulator-the Case of Germany, 39 INT'L
LAW. 3,9 (2005).
172. Id. The system offered nearly complete coverage for most ordinary deposits.
Id. at 10.
173. Id. at 10. Members are subject to regular audits and strict prudential
supervision by the Private Bankers Association. Id.
174. Colon, supra note 167, at 139.
175. Binder, supra note 171, at 9.
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private scheme, all banks must contribute to the statutory DIS 76
Aside from offering the minimum level of coverage as prescribed
by the Directive (ECU 20,000 per depositor),177 the statutory
scheme provides an extra layer of prudential supervision. 78 As
both schemes operate simultaneously, Germany's banking industry
undergoes significant regulatory scrutiny. 9
2. Relevancy: An International Standard
The overarching themes of the Directive reflect concerns
about fair competition, extensive prudential supervision, and
raising awareness among depositors in the context of transnational
banking.' 80 China has already shown its willingness to consider
international standards when developing economic policy. For
instance, China has tightened its regulation of capital adequacy
requirements according to the rules set forth by the Bank for
International Settlements.81 Likewise, the EU Directive provides
China with an idea of what an advanced banking market views as
the essential elements of deposit insurance. From the principles
set forth in the Directive, China may derive its own form of
deposit insurance.'82 Substantively, each country implementing the
EU Directive provides China with a different template for a DIS.'83
The variety of European models for DIS shows that basic
principles enumerated in the EU Directive can exist under diverse
governmental regimes.' 84 For China, this is a promising result, as it
suggests that these principles may be transcendent enough to exist
also under China's socialist regime.
As China faces the prospect of a greater foreign presence in
its banking market, the EU Directive's guidelines on coverage
176. Id.
177. Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103, at art. 7.
178. Binder, supra note 171, at 13.
179. Id. at 10.
180. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
181. Banks: Bank Regulators, supra note 21.
182. See, e.g., supra notes 159-79 and accompanying text (showing that the
flexibility of the Directive allows a country to customize its DIS).
183. See supra notes 159-79 and accompanying text (giving examples from the
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and France).
184. See supra notes 159-79 and accompanying text.
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among domestic and foreign institutions may also prove useful.
The Directive enumerates provisions designed to prevent deposit
insurance from being a source of a competitive disadvantage.1 85 As
mentioned above, "topping off" provisions and standardized
coverage are designed to place foreign and domestic banks on a
level playing field. 186 In addition to inter-institutional
considerations, the interplay between host country and foreign
branches is particularly relevant to China's current situation.' 87
Hence, the Directive may serve as a valuable resource for Chinese
officials forming policy regarding foreign banks competing in the
Chinese market.
C. Russia
1. Basic Structure
Like China, Russia has undertaken to reform its outmoded
banking sector in recent years due to threats of future crises, poor
management, corruption, and the prospect of foreign "n'8
In 2005, Russia introduced a general deposit insurance scheme
(GDI).'8 9 GDI provides full coverage of up to 100,000 rubles
(approximately U.S.$3,700)' 9° of each deposit, along with ninety
percent of the remainder up to 190,000 rubles'9' (approximately
U.S.$7,000)' 92 By 2007, the State Corporation Deposit Insurance
Agency is planning to raise coverage to 300,000 rubles per
185. See, e.g., Scheer, supra note 127, at 190 (discussing the benefits of the
Directive's "topping off" provision).
186. Id. at 189-90.
187. See Lu, supra note 27 (discussing the potential problems facing the Chinese
government with regard to its treatment of foreign investment firms).
188. Russian Banks Hope to Cash in on IPO Rebound, SUNDAY Bus., Mar. 12,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 4177364.
189. Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, Bus. E. EUR., Aug. 21, 2006, available
at 2006 WLNR 14618868.
190. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$7,046.13. See Universal
Currency Converter, supra note 148.
191. Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency Mulls Cutting Contributions, PRIME-TASS,
Aug. 25, 2006.
192. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$3,707.96. See Universal
Currency Converter, supra note 148.
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deposit' 93 (approximately U.S.$11,000).' 94 To obtain coverage,
banks must apply for membership.' 95 All banks, however, must
contribute 0.6% of the total annual deposits received into personal
accounts to GDI.'96 While GDI was intended originally to supply
insurance only to well-capitalized banks, it has been extended
virtually to all banks.' 97 As a result, GDI has grown to over 29.2
billion rubles (approximately U.S.$1.08 billion), s and is expected
to climb to 41 billion rubles by 2007' 99 (approximately U.S.$1.5
billion).20
Though GDI is still in its nascent years, Russia's banking
industry has benefited already from its implementation. 201
According to the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research Electronic Affairs Publication Office in
2005, a lack of faith among depositors was a significant restraint on
the growth of Russia's banking industry.2° One year after the
implementation of GDI, personal deposits increased by forty
percent in Russia.23 This confidence was reflected in a recent
survey, conducted by the Centre for the Study of Financial
Innovation and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 204 Russian respondents
indicated their concerns for inherent risks of the banking industry
were declining. 205 Similarly, respondents showed greater
193. Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency Mulls Cutting Contributions, supra note
191.
194. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$11,125.52. See Universal
Currency Converter, supra note 148.
195. See Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, supra note 189.
196. Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency Mulls Cutting Contributions, supra note
191.
197. See Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, supra note 189. As of March 2006,
929 banks out of 1,150 that applied were admitted. Id.
198. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$1,082,885,221.17. See
Universal Currency Converter, supra note 148.
199. Section: Banks and Exchanges, Russ. FIN. REP., Sept. 4, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 15304671.
200. In October 2006, this amounted to exactly U.S.$1,520,489,523.43. See
Universal Currency Converter, supra note 148.
201. See State Department Issues Background Note on Russia, U.S. FED. NEWS,
Aug. 1, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13363812.
202. Id.
203. Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, supra note 189.
204. See PricewaterhouseCoopers Evaluates Russian Country Risks, SKRIN
MARKET AND CORP. NEWS, Sept. 4, 2006.
205. Id.
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acceptance of regulation,20 which also suggests that recent reforms
have been successful. The extra deposits have stimulated growth
within the banking industry, enabling institutions to increase both
consumer and commercial lending.20 7 In turn, this demonstrated
improvement in the banking industry has contributed to a 6.4%
growth in Russia's economy.2 8 Reaction to such improvements
was not limited to Moscow; foreign investors also have been
attentive to Russia's banking sector in light of recent
improvements.209
2. Relevancy: A Familiar Situation
Russia serves as a guide from which China can learn how to
implement its DIS for three reasons. First, both China and Russia
• . 210
wish to open their banking systems to foreign investments.
Accordingly, both have adopted reform plans with the stated
purpose of comporting with international standards.211 Second,
China and Russia both struggle with the residual effects of a212
rudimentary banking system. Both must contend with high risk
designations by the international community,' as well as a lack of
consumer faith in the banking industry.1 Moreover, both systems
have been rife with bank mismanagement, poor lending practices,
and scandal.215 Finally, both countries share a history of balancing
206. Id.
207. Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, supra note 189.
208. Russian Banks Hope to Cash in on IPO Rebound, supra note 188.
209. See generally id. (noting that the success of listing Russia's banks on foreign
markets has been successful as a result of reforms).
210. Id.; see also The Operating Environment: Foreign Investment, supra note 101.
211. The Operating Environment: Foreign Investment, supra note 101; see generally
Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, supra note 189 (referring to reforms in terms
of Russia's ability to gain entry into the WTO).
212. See Russian Banks Hope to Cash in on IPO Rebound, supra note 188
(referring to Russia as having an "antiquated" banking system); see also Fred Hu,
Comment: The Truth about Investing in China's Banks, FIN. TIMES ASIA, Nov. 18,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 18641275 (referring to China's banking system as
"antiquated").
213. Asian Banks Face Cyclical Risks: S & P, supra note 33; State Department
Issues Background Note on Russia, supra note 201.
214. PricewaterhouseCoopers Evaluates Russian Country Risks, supra note 204;
Asian Banks Face Cyclical Risks: S & P, supra note 33.
215. Prioritize Bank Reforms, supra note 47; Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off,
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216planned economies with market-oriented economies. Although
soviet control in Russia ended in 1991,27 vestiges from the
communist era remain. Similarly, Chinese officials have noted
the delicate balance that must be struck between socialist ideals
and the attraction of market-orientation. Capitalist innovations
are not intended to replace communism in China.22° On the
contrary, capitalist methods are often abrogated by socialist policy,
demonstrating that China vigorously adheres to its Marxist
ideals .22 Russia, therefore, may enlighten China as to the struggles
facing a synthesis of these two ideologies.
V. DISCUSSION: DIS IN CHINA
Depending on the features of China's DIS, deposit
insurance can significantly alleviate problems regarding bankS• 222
mismanagement and risky loan practices. In addition, deposit
insurance may provide another layer of protection for China
during future financial crises, as well as enable China to better
compete with foreign banks domestically.
221
A. What Features Should China Adopt?
1. Funding
Any DIS must have adequate financing in order to work
properly, and the method of funding is an essential element of a
supra note 189; see also State Department Issues Background Note on Russia, supra
note 201 (noting that "corruption remains a serious problem" for effective regulation
of many business sectors).
216. China is in Favor of More Reform, supra note 11; see generally State
Department Issues Background Note on Russia, supra note 201 (describing Russia's
Soviet history, its demise, and the introduction of capitalism).
217. State Department Issues Background Note on Russia, supra note 201.
218. See id. ("Leftover attitudes from the Soviet period will take many years to
overcome.").
219. China is in Favor of More Reform, supra note 11.
220. See generally Wang, supra note 104 (explaining that property reforms in
China, while based on democratic innovations, are always subject to the limitations of
China's pervasive socialist policy).
221. See Wang, supra note 104, at 619-20.
222. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text.
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DIS.224 Since Chinese officials have expressed the desire to turn
banks into freestanding institutions, the DIS likely will be funded
by Chinese banks themselves, 226 notwithstanding some
contributions from the government. This form of DIS would
best serve China because it would force banks to have a stake in
improving banking practices.228  As seen in the newly-formed
system in Russia, 229 requiring all banks to contribute a percentage
of total deposits to the DIS improves banking management.23 °
China must determine whether to collect funds ex-ante or
ex-post. 2 1 Ex-ante collections create a reserve fund so that when a
bank failure occurs, money is available for immediate
disbursement.232 The FDIC, for example, is an ex-ante system.
3
Alternatively, ex-post collections occur only after a bank fails.23
So long as no institutions fail, banks do not have to contribute to
the fund.235 The ex-post form allows banks greater liquidity during
stable periods, and it may encourage greater self-regulation among
member banks.236 This form, however, involves a slow and more
237tedious reimbursement process. It is also criticized because the
beneficiaries of the DIS-the banks that fail-may avoid ever
paying into the system.238 As a result, the ex-ante approach is the
224. Suphap, supra note 64, at 835-36.
225. Minister: China to Set Up National Financial Regulator, supra note 8.
226. See Banks: Bank Regulators, supra note 21 (reporting that officials disclosed
that the system would likely be funded by banks themselves).
227. See MACDONALD, supra note 166, at 13 (noting that frequently the
government of a developing nation partially funds the DIS).
228. See id.
229. Russia's Deposit Insurance Agency Mulls Cutting Contributions, supra note
191.
230. PricewaterhouseCoopers Evaluates Russian Country Risks, supra note 204
(noting that risk management techniques have improved such that survey
respondents do not consider it as big of a risk for the banking industry).
231. See Suphap, supra note 64, at 835-36. The author emphasizes that the
collection of funds is a crucial part of forming a DIS. Id. Some countries also may
use a combination of ex-ante and ex-post collection methods to build up the fund. Id.
at 836-37.
232. Id. at 836.
233. Macey, supra note 59, at 8.
234. Id. at 4; Suphap, supra note 64, at 836.
235. Suphap, supra note 64, at 836.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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popular choice.2 9 For China, an established fund likely would
reassure its depositors that their accounts are protected.240 Since
ex-ante collections are the preferred method, 41 China also has
more models from which to learn the benefits and potential pitfalls
of ex-ante fundraising.
Assuming banks contribute to the DIS, China has a choice
242between flat-rate premiums and risk-adjusted premiums. A flat-
rate premium charges banks a fixed amount per institution,
making it easy to assess on banks.243 Usually, banks are charged at
a rate of between 0.01% and 0.50% of total deposits.24 Flat-rate
premiums are criticized for being unfair because the rate is
determined irrespective of the institutions' riskiness or stability.
245
Since China's banking industry is dominated by the Big Four, all of
which share similar risk and stability problems,2'4 a flat-rate would
not seemingly be unfair to impose on any of the banks. Moreover,
flat-rate premiums have been consistently used in most DISs.4 7
Nearly fifty countries implement a flat-rate premium to generate
funds for a DIS.2 48
In contrast, risk-adjusted premiums vary by institution.249
The regulatory agency assesses how much a particular bank owes
based on a series of factors, which may include, "the amount
insured, estimated risk rating, solvency, profitability, and
transformation and granularity measures., 250 For example, France,
Canada, Finland, Turkey and the United States have implemented
239. Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, supra note 115; Suphap, supra note 64, at 836.
240. See MACDONALD, supra note 166, at 10-11 (describing the differences
between an implicit versus explicit form of deposit insurance).
241. Suphap, supra note 64, at 836.
242. See INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR
DEVELOPING DIFFERENTIAL PREMIUM SYSTEMS 3-4 (Feb. 2005) (discussing the
general considerations regarding funding arrangements for DIS).
243. Id. at 3.
244. MACDONALD, supra note 166, at 19.
245. INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 3.
246. See supra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
247. INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 3 ("Most deposit
insurance systems initially adopt an ex-ante flat-rate premium system because they
are relatively simple to design, implement[,] and administer.").
248. Suphap, supra note 64, at 837.
249. Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, supra note 115.
250. Suphap, supra note 64, at 837-38 (quoting France's DIS).
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risk-adjusted premiums, although the FDIC was funded by flat-
rate premiums for the first sixty years of its existence.25
Chinese officials have indicated that banks will be charged
differently based on a risk assessment. 2 2 While a risk-adjusted
premium scheme is more comprehensive and detailed,253 several
disadvantages give cause for concern. First, the operating costs for
254
a risk-adjusted premium are greater than for a flat-rate premium.
Also, the methods involved in risk-assessment remain imprecise,
as the information needed for assessment is often difficult to
procure from institutions.255 A recent International Association of
Deposit Insurers survey showed that, while many regimes found
risk-adjusted premiums attractive, most developing countries
chose flat-rate premiums in order to build up their insurance
funds. 216 Accordingly, risk-adjusted premiums usually have been
introduced only in more advanced banking systems. 7 Thus, while
risk-adjusted premiums may ultimately become the preferred
method, its implementation in China's banking system may be
premature. Instead, China's banking industry would be served
better by imposing a flat-rate premium initially, leaving open the
option to switch to risk-adjusted rates in the future.258
Risk-adjusted premiums, however, have one significant
advantage particularly relevant to China. By basing premiums on
the riskiness of the institution, banks have a greater interest in
practicing conservative lending. 219  In this way, risk-adjusted
premiums reduce moral hazard. 260 Similarly, risk-adjusted
premiums require greater transparency among bank managers and
251. Id.; INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 4.
252. Leo Zhang, Unified Rating System Launched for Banks, CHINA DAILY, Dec.
5, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/05/content
5004 20.htm.
253. INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 4.
254. Suphap, supra note 64, at 845-46.
255. Id. at 844-45.
256. RESEARCH AND GUIDANCE COMM., INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra
note 81, at 13.
257. Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, supra note 115.
258. See INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 3-4. The author
indicates that systems may begin initially as a flat-rate system, with a subsequent
progression into a risk-adjusted system. Id.
259. Suphap, supra note 64, at 840-41.
260. Id.
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compliance with regulations. 261 For China, this feature is
particularly significant because it further incorporates bank
supervision into reforms. 212  Thus, by charging a risk-based
premium, China may improve its reputation as a high-risk
market.263
2. Membership Regulations
Subscription to the DIS in China should be mandatory, at
least for the Big Four.26 4 With regard to financial cooperatives,
smaller and more rural banks, membership should be determined
by an extensive examination of the bank's risk assessment andlendig .. 265
lending practices. Drawing from other countries, China should
weigh factors such as net worth of the institution, quality of assets,
potentially problematic financial practices, quality of bank
266management, and compliance with regulations. While China
should thoroughly review an institution's practices, the standards
should not be so high that deposit insurance is available only to a
minority of banks.267 Although China has taken steps to close
261. Id. at 846-47.
262. See id.
263. See generally Asian Banks Face Cyclical Risks: S & P, supra note 33
(discussing how reforms seek to lower Asia's reputation as a high risk market).
264. See INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 5-6. Under a
quantitative approach to determining premiums, capital adequacy is the primary
factor. Id. at 6. The Big Four would satisfy this factor, since they dominate industry.
Banks: Domestic Banks, supra note 17.
265. See INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 5-8. Banks may be
subject to either a quantitative or qualitative examination, or a combination of both
approaches. Id. Under the quantitative approach, factors include: capital adequacy,
diversification and quality of assets, volatility of earnings, sources of funding, cash
flow, and overall stability of operations. Id. Under a qualitative inquiry, factors are
reflected in the CAMEL approach: capital, asset quality, management, earnings, and
liquidity. Id. at 7. Officials may also weigh subjective factors, such as an institution's
reputation, track record in compliance, and expert opinions of industry analysts. Id.
at 7.
266. See, e.g., Div. OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FDIC, supra note 89, at 34-35
(listing these factors for consideration); see also INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS,
supra note 242, at 6-7.
267. See generally INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra note 242, at 9-11
(discussing several problems relating to an overly scrutinizing examination of
institutions).
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especially problematic banks in rural areas,268 it probably will offer
insurance to many of its smaller banks, much like Russia, 69
because guaranteeing deposits will allow smaller banks to compete
with larger institutions for deposits.270 The European Union noted
this fact in its Directive by commenting that a DIS eliminates an
unequal protection that gives larger institutions an unfair
competitive advantage over smaller institutions.Y In this way, DIS
may have an equalizing effect in the Chinese banking industry.
3. Coverage
While each country has its own special considerations
regarding deposit insurance,272 research shows that countries
developing a DIS consult international levels of coverage when
determining the maximum coverage limit.273 On the one hand, the
amount should be sufficient to cover most deposits.274 While
setting a lower limit of coverage places the burden on depositors to
scrutinize institutions, deposit insurance is intended to protect the
unwitting, passive depositor.275 On the other hand, the coverage
should not be so high that it creates a moral hazard for bank
276management. Also, 100% coverage of all deposits would place
277no burden on depositors to safeguard their own deposits.
Amounts vary worldwide, with the United States offering some of
278the highest coverage at U.S.$100,000 per deposit. By
comparison, the European Union sets a minimum requirement of
268. Editorial, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 17, 2005 [hereinafter Jan. 17, 2005
Editorial], available at 2005 WLNR 613755.
269. Russia: Industry Forecast: Taking Off, supra note 189.
270. See, e.g., Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103 (noting that a DIS has an
equalizing effect).
271. Id.
272. MACDONALD, supra note 166, at 17.
273. RESEARCH AND GUIDANCE COMM., INT'L ASS'N OF DEPOSIT INSURERS, supra
note 81, at 11.
274. See Demirguc-Kunt & Sobaci, supra note 115 (noting that low coverage limits
would force depositors to look elsewhere to deposit their money).
275. See id.
276. Suphap, supra note 64, at 840-41.
277. MACDONALD, supra note 166, at 9.
278. FDIC, supra note 126.
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approximately U.S.$25,000.279 Typically, more developed countries
offer higher coverage, which may be a function of the size of
deposits being insured. 28  Some countries, however, determine
their level of coverage based on the size of the national
economy.281 Under this approach, China likely would offer
significant coverage.2  Since China is seeking to comport with
international standards, it should offer at least as much coverage as
the European Union mandates. m Given the size of China's
economy, however, it could err on the side of providing
proportionally as much coverage as the FDIC.'
B. Other Factors Affecting the Impact of Deposit Insurance
In addition to the particular features of China's DIS, the
system's success depends also on the further privatization of
2815SOEs. China passed the Company Law of 1994 in an effort to
turn SOEs into more autonomous entities.26 In doing so, SOEs
bear the consequences of both the profits and losses they incur. 287
In the first ten years since the legislation, China has closed 3,484
SOEs." 8 Also, as China's markets open up to foreign competition,
the effects of SOEs on the economy-and the banking industry in
particular-likely will diminish. 289  Officials have indicated,
however, that banks may still be required to provide loans to
SOEs, even if the entity is unlikely to repay the loan.290
Consequently, this retention of power by the State may undermine
the effectiveness of a DIS. 291  Also, the government should
279. Council Directive 94/19, supra note 103, at art. 7.
280. MACDONALD, supra note 166, at 17.
281. Id.
282. Wang, supra note 104, at 599 (noting that China's economy is growing at a
"record rate").
283. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
286. The Operating Environment: State Role in the Economy, supra note 35.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Editorial, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
1054679.
291. See Jamil Anderlini, Bankruptcy System on Agenda for Banks, S. CHINA
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continue to transform banks into profit-oriented institutions, as
profits provide bank managers with incentives to operate
efficiently and with prudence.92 Finally, China must continue to
close unstable banks.' 93 By removing such institutions, China
improves the chances that a DIS will succeed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As it plans to introduce deposit insurance to its banking
sector, China will continue to "cross the river by feeling the
stones."2 94 Deposit insurance exists in a variety of forms around
the world. 29' Accordingly, China has many sources from which to
adopt a DIS. 96 Given its history of adopting other countries' legal
frameworks, China likely will draw from the tested system in the
United States, the guidance offered by the European Union, and
297the example of Russia. In doing so, China has the benefit of
hindsight. Each model from which it draws to create its own
system of DIS will provide China with the ability to pick and
choose a custom DIS. 298 The introduction of a DIS in China,
especially one that incorporates vigorous prudential supervision,
will help to alleviate industry problems regarding bank
mismanagement and risky loan practices.299 In addition, a DIS will
create a sound regulatory framework, giving China the best chance
of capitalizing on the influx of foreign investment into its banking
industry.3°° A DIS will help China become a key player in the
global financial industry. It is therefore fortunate that China has
awakened to the fact that a DIS is one of many "stones" it must
MORNING POST, Dec. 15, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 21594416 (noting that the
government still has "propped up" banks in the wake of SOE failures).
292. See Chen, supra note 38, at 248.
293. Jan. 17, 2005 Editorial, supra note 268.
294. Roy, supra note 1.
295. See, e.g., supra notes 159-79 and accompanying text (describing various forms
of DIS found in Europe).
296. See, e.g., supra notes 117-221 and accompanying text (describing the U.S.,
Russian, and European Union DIS models and each system's relevancy to China's
current financial and political situation).
297. See supra notes 106-221 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 117-293 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
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employ as it transforms itself from a rudimentary to advanced
banking nation.
DANIEL L. MCCULLOUGH
